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Abstract
We give a rigorous framework for the interaction of physical computing devices with
abstract computation. Device and program are mediated by the non-logical representation
relation; we give the conditions under which representation and device theory give rise to
commuting diagrams between logical and physical domains, and the conditions for com-
putation to occur. We give the interface of this new framework with currently existing
formal methods, showing in particular its close relationship to refinement theory, and the
implications for questions of meaning and reference in theoretical computer science. The
case of hybrid computing is considered in detail, addressing in particular the example of
an internet-mediated social machine, and the abstraction/representation framework used to
provide a formal distinction between heterotic and hybrid computing. This forms the basis
for future use of the framework in formal treatments of nonstandard physical computers.
1 Introduction
Computer Science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes.
– E. Dijkstra (attrib.)
That is incorrect.
– Lt. Cmdr. Data (Star Trek)
Heterotic hybrid computing involves the combination of two or more distinct computational sub-
strates into a computing system whose power is greater than that of its individual components
[1, 2]. Such devices have come into prominence with the slowdown of Moore’s Law, and the subse-
quent search for different ways to increase computing power beyond standard silicon-based digital
computers. The most well-developed such system is quantum computing [3]; while not usually
presented as a hybrid device, a realistic quantum computer requires a large and integrated clas-
sical control computer, in particular for performing error correction [4]. Other examples include
proposed chemical [5, 6] and biological [7, 8] nonstandard computers, again requiring classical
control. Also included are biological systems interfacing with digital software (for instance [9]).
A different direction for heterotic systems is opened up by the enormous data gathering and
communication possibilities available online. A key recent insight there has been the recognition
of ‘social machines’: computational ecosystems comprising both digital computers and multiple
human users, all acting towards a computational goal [10, 11]. Important social machines include
∗DCH published previously as Clare Horsman.
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Wikipedia [12] and crowdsourced science such as Galaxy Zoo [13]. As the space of these devices
and interactions expands, heterotic forms of computing will continue to be a growth area in the
very near future.
With the expansion of importance of such systems, questions of their computational foun-
dations become newly prominent. Discussion within the unconventional computing community
has often become stuck in discussion over (super-)Turing computable behaviour. For practical
hybrid devices there are much more pressing concerns. The large toolkit of mathematical and
abstract methods for computer science (semantics, logical calculi, programming, verification,
etc) has historically been developed in parallel with standard digital computers. Unfortunately,
non-standard computing substrates and devices almost never admit a native description in terms
of such standard abstract methods. This means that their computing power is both largely un-
known and underutilized. They also lack the formal underpinnings that have proved so powerful
in standard computer science. For hybrid devices in particular, a lack of formalisation of the
individual components means a lack of a combined formalisation when they are put together.
The lack of formalism for novel devices stems not (just) from a lack of understanding about
their abilities, but from the way in which standard formal methods have been developed and
used. The groundbreaking understanding of Lovelace, Turing, and Shannon, which gave rise
to modern computer science, was that the computers they were considering had a theoretical
representation separate from their specific physical implementation. While inspired by certain
physical devices (the Analytical Engine, the Bombe, the differential analyzer, etc), the associated
formal systems could be manipulated without reference to any physically realised system. The
interface between the abstract methods of computer science and the physical engineering of
computers was, however, not itself formalised. Computers appear within the formalism, if at all,
as mathematical or logical abstractions, not as the physical devices themselves.
This separation proved to be extremely powerful, and was largely responsible for the rapid
expansion of the modern science of computers. However as nonstandard, and in particular
hybrid, devices now come to prominence, having only an informal connection between the physical
device and the abstract formal theory becomes significantly problematic. With a purely informal
interface between the two, there is no straightforward way to reach standard abstract computer
science from a novel computing substrate. Even if an ad-hoc mapping can be considered for some
particular non-standard devices (e.g.. a certain neural net ‘implements an xor’), this cannot
be straightforwardly combined with another system with a different mapping to create a hybrid
computational device. There is no way formally to combine such informal mappings, meaning
that until now there has been no integrated framework that allows for the abstract treatment of
nonstandard and hybrid computers.
In this paper we give formal foundations for the interaction of hybrid computing systems
through the use of Abstraction/Representation Theory1 (AR theory). Recently introduced, AR
theory allows us make rigorous the interface between physical computing systems and their ab-
stract, mathematical, representation. AR theory was developed in [14] to address the question of
which physical dynamical systems are properly represented as computing systems. In the present
paper we give a formal treatment of the theory in the context of the foundations of computer
science, centering on the representation relation between data processing physical systems and
the abstract objects of standard computing theory. AR theory comes equipped with both an
algebraic and a graphical language of commuting diagrams, and we show how this interfaces
with similar, known, formal methods. The discussion is conducted with particular reference to
three elements in the foundations of computer science – not as an exhaustive list, but to give the
reader a broader understanding of the place AR theory occupies in computing theory. We show
how AR theory supplements refinement and reification, allowing upwards/downwards simulation
1I am indebted to Aleks Kissinger for the name.
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Figure 1: Basic representation. (a) Spaces of abstract and physical objects (here, a switch with
two settings and a binary digit). (b) The directed representation relation R mediating between
the spaces.
diagrams to be embedded in physical computing devices. We touch on the category-theoretic
underpinnings of such diagrams, and consider also the relationship to the interactions between
concrete and abstract semantics given by Abstract Interpretation. By grounding computer sci-
ence in the physical world, questions of ontology and semantics for computational formal systems
can also be addressed, and we will focus in particular on lambda calculi in this regard.
In the presence of AR theory, computer science becomes the natural science of the computing
abilities of physical systems. While seemingly a very different foundational view of computing,
it is in fact a supplement to, rather than a repudiation of, standard computability theory. It is
a theory of computing to add to our current theories of computation. AR theory allows more
physical devices, both individually and as heterotic systems, to be brought under the umbrella of
abstract computation theory, while remaining agnostic about questions around their universality
and/or Turing completeness. The addition of AR theory to the standard toolkit of computer
science promises to greatly increase our power to reason about complex computational physical
devices.
2 Basic elements of AR theory
AR theory was introduced in [14], with that paper giving the full physical and philosophical
background for the framework. The present paper is concerned with its formalisation for use
specifically in computer science. That previous work should be referenced for questions con-
cerning the broad ontology and context of AR theory, which will not in general be reiterated
here.
AR theory concerns objects in the domain of physical systems, abstract objects (including
mathematical and logical entities), and the representation relation which mediates between the
two. The distinction between the two spaces, abstract and physical, is fundamental in the theory,
as is their connection only by the (directed) representation relation. An intuitive example is given
in figure 1: a physical switch is represented by an abstract bit by some representation.
This separation of physical and abstract domains necessitates our first definitions:
Definition 1. The physical domain, P, consists of all physical objects, p ∈ P.
Definition 2. The abstract domain, M , consists of all abstract objects, m ∈M .
A computer is an object in the domain of physical entities, usually with internal degrees of
freedom and physical evolution occurring between initial and final output states. A computation
is a set of objects and relations within the domain of abstract entities, as described in the logical
3
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Figure 2: Parallel evolution of abstract evolution (e.g.. an algorithm) and potential physical
computing device. (a) The basic representational triple, 〈p,R,mp〉: physical system p is rep-
resented abstractly by mp using the modelling representation relation RT of theory T . (b)
Abstract dynamics CT (mp) give the evolved abstract state m
′
p
. (c) Physical dynamics H(p)
give the final physical state p′. (d) RT is used again to represent p
′ as the abstract output mp′ .
formalisms of theoretical computer science. Bold font is used to indicated where an object or
evolution is physical. Abstract objects are represented using an italic font.
The elementary representation relation is the directed map R : P → M . When two objects
are connected by R we write them as R : p → mp. The abstract object mp is then said to
be the abstract representation of the physical object p, and together they form one of the basic
composites of AR theory, the representational triple 〈p,R,mp〉. The basic representational triple
is shown in figure 2(a).
The next map we introduce is that of abstract evolution. This takes abstract objects to
abstract objects: C : M → M . An individual example is shown in figure 2(b), for the mapping
C(mp) taking mp → m
′
p
. The corresponding physical evolution map is given by H : P → P.
For individual elements in figure 2(c) this is H(p) which takes p→ p′.
In order to reach the next key concept in AR theory, we now apply the representation relation
to the outcome state of the physical evolution to give its abstract representationmp′ . This forms
another representational triple 〈p′,R,mp′〉, figure 2(d). We now have two abstract object, m
′
p
and mp′ . For some error quantity ε and norm ||, if |mp′ − m
′
p
| ≤ ε then the diagram 2(d)
commutes. Commuting diagrams are fundamental to the use of AR theory. Definitionally,
Definition 3. A commuting diagram in AR theory comprises two representational triples
〈p,R,mp〉 and 〈p
′,R,mp′〉, and pair of abstract and physical evolutions C(mp) : mp → m
′
p
and
H(p) : p→ p′, which satisfy the condition |mp′ −m
′
p
| ≤ ε.
If a set of abstract and physical objects form a commuting diagram under representation,
then mp is a faithful abstract representation of physical system p for the evolutions C(mp) and
H(p).
The main implication of having a faithful abstract representation for a physical system is
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that the final state of a physical object undergoing evolution can be known either by tracking
the physical evolution and then representing the output abstractly, or by theoretically evolving
the representation of the system. In the first case, the ‘lower path’ of a commuting diagram is
followed; in the latter, the ‘upper path’. Finding out which diagrams commute is the business
of basic experimental science, and their initial exploitation that of fundamental engineering and
technology.
In experimental science, a test for commutation of a diagram involves producing a controlled
physical setup (the experiment) about which has both an abstract representation R and an
abstract prediction of how it will behave, C. The physical system p is evolved under the physical
experimental dynamics H, and the outcome compared to the theoretical prediction. If they
coincide within the error tolerance of the experiment and the desired outcome confidence, then
the diagram commutes.
This is not, of course, the purpose of an experiment. Experiments are designed in order to
test not a single scenario but a theory. We now bring in the final element of basic AR theory:
Definition 4. A theory, T , is a set of representation relations RT for physical objects, a domain
of such objects for which it is purported to be valid, and a set of abstract predictive dynamics for
the output of the representations, mp, C(mp).
If a theory supports commuting diagrams for all scenarios in which it has been both defined
and tested, then it is a valid theory2.
A physical system or device that is both well tested and well understood will in general have
a large number of commuting diagrams supporting it. This is a necessary condition for a theory
to be good, but not a sufficient one. Furthermore, if a theory is a good theory then we can be
confident that it will give rise to commuting diagrams outside the domain either or objects or
dynamics for which it has been tested.
3 What representation is not
Computing relies on having a good and valid well-developed theory of the physical computing
device. Commuting diagrams such as figure 3 do not, however, describe the actual process of
computing itself, rather are the prerequisites for us to use the physical system as a computer. A
computer must, however, satisfy a set of these diagrams. It is therefore useful at this point to
consider such commuting diagrams for a computer, and specify exactly what is being described
in the AR description of such a device.
A commuting diagram in the context of computation connects the physical computing device,
p, and its abstract representationmp. mp can be a number of different abstract representations –
we go into this in more detail below, for now we takemp to be drawn from the set of binary strings
(see figure 3). The abstract evolution is then the (binary) program to be run on the computer, and
the physical evolution is how the state of the computer changes during the program (change of
voltages etc). The full commuting diagram describes the parallel evolution of physical computer
and abstract algorithm. They are connected via the representation given by the theory of the
computing device, RT .
What precisely does the relationship given by AR theory between computer and computation
consist in? That is, how does AR theory describe and define the relation between physical and
abstract computational objects and evolutions, and what attributes does it give to this relation-
ship? It is instructive at this point to compare the AR diagram figure 3 with an existing formal
framework that can appear at first sight to be very similar. The representation of computation
2It may not, however, necessarily be a good theory.
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Figure 3: A commuting diagram for a sequence of gate operations (here, binary addition) for
abstract and physical systems, for later use as a computing device.
given by Abstract Interpretation [15] involves a concrete semantics modelling the operation of
the computing system, an abstract semantics representing the algorithm or program to be run,
and the functional abstraction relation mapping between the two. Is this not, then, precisely
what we have described with AR theory?
The reason why the answer to this question is ‘no’ gets to the heart of AR theory and what it
is modelling in the representation relation. In Abstract Interpretation, the concrete semantics is
designed to represent the operation of the physical device, but is not the physical device. It is an
abstract, mathematical representation of the physical system, not the physical system itself. As a
consequence, the abstraction relation between concrete and abstract semantics is a mathematical
function, taking mathematical objects as both its domain and range.
By contrast, reference to the physical system within AR theory is to the physical system itself,
not a representation of it. p is a physical object, mp its mathematical/logical representation.
The concrete semantics of Abstract Interpretation are objects in the space M not the space P.
AR theory concerns how physical objects qua physical objects relate to their own abstract rep-
resentation, rather than how different types of abstract representation interact with each other.
As a consequence, p must stand for the physical system and not some pre-defined representation;
a model, a program, or a semantics, however low-level, is still a representation of the physical
system, mp, not the physical system, p, itself.
This is the core of AR theory, and it cannot be over-emphasised: R as a representation
relation is not a mathematical relation. Neither is it a logical relation. It is a relation whose
domain is physical objects and whose range is abstract/mathematical objects: it is a represen-
tation relation. This is an entirely new kind of relation, one that is key to understanding how
physical computing devices operate by mediating between the level of physics and the level of
data manipulation.
4 Computing in AR theory
The parallel evolution of physical device and abstract program in figure 3 is not yet the AR
representation of using that device to perform a computation. In order to describe computing,
we need one final element of AR theory, this time not a basic element but a composed one.
The representation relation defined here is directed, from physical to abstract objects. This
is modelling: giving an abstract representation of a physical object. The question can now be
posed: is it possible to give a reversed representation relation, an instantiation relation? This
will not be a basic relation in the same way as the ordinary (modelling) representation relation is
basic: abstract representation can be given for any physical object (this is language), but there
are plenty of abstract objects that do not have a physical instantiation (‘unicorn’, ‘infinite-tape
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Figure 4: The instantiation relation. The combination of the conditions is a commuting diagram.
Turing machine’, f(x) =
∑
k(pik
2)−1 sin(pik2x), etc). Only in very specific circumstances can an
instantiation relation R˜T be given for a theory T .
To find these circumstances, consider again the ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ paths of a commuting
diagram, (p0 → mp0 → m
′
p0
) and (p0 → p → [mp = m
′
p0
]) respectively. Between them, these
paths describe the process of finding some p0 such that when it is subjected to the physical
process H : p0 → p it becomes the physical system p whose abstract representation is mp. In
other words, if both paths are present and form a commuting diagram, the theory T can be used
to engineer system p from system p0 given a desired abstract specification mp. Together, then,
they stand as a shorthand for the instantiation relation R˜T , as in figure 4.
The instantiation relation is given only when T is both good and valid. It then permits
the construction of an instantiational triple, 〈mp, R˜T ,p〉. The system p is then the physical
instantiation of the abstract object mp for theory T .
A use of the instantiation relation can be seen as a counterfactual use of the representation
relation: which physical system, when represented abstractly, would give the abstract representa-
tion that we are trying to instantiate? The method by which it is achieved will vary considerably
given different scenarios: trial and error, abstract reasoning, numerical simulation, etc. What
connects these methods is that they are not straightforward: it is generally a skillful and creative
process to reverse a representation relation.
In computing, the use of an instantiation relation is the act of encoding and initialisation. At
its simplest, this is the encoding of abstract data in a physical device, from turning a dial to a
specified input state, punching a set of holes on a card, to initialising a series of voltages across
a semiconductor. In all cases, how data are represented by physical objects is determined both
by the available physics of the system and by design choices.
Initialisation is the first step in the AR cycle for computing. This has one immediate implica-
tion: that a device cannot be used as a computer until its theory, T , is well-understood, as good
and valid. If it is not, then R˜T cannot be formed with any confidence, and only experiment or
engineering or technology cycles can be constructed with the device, not a compute cycle.
The compute cycle starts from a set of abstract objects – the program and initial state that
are to be computed. The existence of an abstract problem, embedded usually as an input and
a program, is the reason why a physical computer is to be used, figure 5(a). Consider again the
problem of figure 3, binary addition of two 2-bit numbers: 01 + 10 = 11.
The abstract initial state, mp = {01, 10} is encoded, through R˜T , in the physical system p,
figure 5(a). The representation relation determines that detecting a high voltage corresponds
to representing a ‘1’, and low voltage is ‘0’. The initial physical setup therefore instantiates
an initial abstract state. In this example, two parts of the hardware are designated by RT as
‘registers’, and the voltages in the components of those areas correspond to the representation
of the initial state as ‘01’ and ‘10’ (the two numbers we wish to add).
At the abstract level, this initial state is now the input to a sequence of gate operations CT
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Figure 5: Physical computing: (a) Embedding an abstract problem M(S) into an abstract
machine description mp using embedding ∆, then encoding into p. (b) Full AR diagram for
addition of two binary numbers using a computer (compare with figure 3). (c) The ‘compute
cycle’: using a reversed representation relation to encode data, physical evolution of the computer
is used to predict abstract evolution.
that takes ‘01,10’ and performs addition, figure 5(b) . At the physical level, a physical evolution
H(p) is applied to the state, producing the final physical state p′. Here, this will be the hardware
manipulation of voltages.
Finally, an application of RT takes the final physical state and represents it abstractly as
some mp′ . After this decoding step, if the computer has the correct answer then m
′
p
= (11). If
we have confidence in the theory of the computer, then we are confident that mp′ = m
′
p
, and
that this would be the outcome of the abstract evolution.
While a computer can be described in the above terms, as a parallel evolution of abstract and
physical systems, the most important use of a computing system is when the abstract outcome
m′
p
is unknown: when computers are used to solve problems. In our example, if the outcome of
01 + 10 were unknown, and the computing device being used to compute it, the final abstract
state, m′
p
= (11), would not be evolved abstractly. Instead, confidence in the technological
capabilities of the computer would enable the user to reach the final, abstract, output state
mp′ = m
′
p
using the physical evolution of the computing device alone.
This use of a physical computer is the compute cycle, figure 5(c):
(mp
R˜T−−→ p −→ p′
RT−−→ [mp′ = m
′
p
])
This gives us the following definitions within AR theory:
Definition 5. A computer is a (usually highly-engineered) device in the physical domain with
a good and valid theory T , together with representation and instantiation relations, RT , R˜T , and
the relevant commuting diagrams, which support compute cycles for its specific domain of inputs
{mp} and computational operations {CT }.
Definition 6. Physical computing is the use of a computer (a physical system) to predict the
outcome of a computation (an abstract evolution) through a compute cycle.
5 Refinement and representation
The definition of physical computing, Definition 6, makes clear what was noted at the beginning
of this paper: that AR theory is a supplement to existing theories of computation, rather than a
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Figure 6: Physical computation, with layers of refinement S on top for base ten (decimal) addition
(“dec add”), binary addition (“binary add”), and assembly language addition (“asm add”). Note
the physical device and representation differ in each case.
replacement of them. With the main machinery of AR theory in place, we can now see exactly
where this framework fits in terms of the standard formal methods of computer science.
Perhaps the most immediate similarity to existing methods is with those of refinement theory
(see for example [16]). Refinement (alternatively, reification), in its simplest form, takes an
abstract algorithm and produces an equivalent concrete machine code that can be implemented
on a computer. In general, it describes the relationship between different levels of abstraction
in computing code. For a refinement to be correct, the more concrete representation must
faithfully implement the abstract specification. The concrete and abstract semantics of Abstract
Interpretation, discussed briefly above, can be viewed as related by a refinement.
Refinement between levels of abstraction is governed by logico-mathematical refinement rela-
tions. If these relations are correct, then the levels of abstraction form commuting diagrams. At
first sight, these refinement relations seem very similar to the representation and instantiation
relations, and we will see that there are connections between the two. However, as with Abstract
Interpretation, the operations and outcomes of refinement take place entirely within the abstract
domain: even once a refinement is complete down to a machine code, this is still an abstract
specification of the higher-level algorithm.
AR theory sits underneath this bottom level of a refinement stack, connecting the abstract
system specification with the physical computing device. Figure 6 shows the connected stack
reaching into the physical domain via the compute cycle. Different machine codes and differ-
ent physical computers are given in each example. As a consequence, the representation and
instantiation relations in each example are different.
The connection between representation and refinement now becomes clear: a representation
can be viewed as similar to a refinement between physical and abstract levels. RT and R˜T differ
from SAB,BC in being non-mathematical relations, and in not being bi-directional; however,
there are important structural similarities between AR theory and refinement theory that can
now be brought out.
The full use of a refinement for computation, shown in the upper levels of figure 6, is ver-
ified through the correctness of one of two separate cycles: those of downwards/forwards and
upwards/backwards simulation [17] (for example). The use of forward vs backward refinement
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Figure 7: Analogues between cycles in AR and refinement theories: (a) Downwards/forwards
simulation (also called history) and technology; (b) Upwards/backwards simulation (also called
prophecy) and scientific prediction.
proofs is governed by the point in the computation that any indeterminism is resolved [18].
These cycle are correct if the corresponding diagrams commute. Replacing a downwards refine-
ment arrow with RT and an upwards one with R˜T , we can give the AR diagrams spanning the
abstract-physical divide which correspond to these two types of simulation, figure 7.
We see immediately that downwards simulation is analogous to technology (implementing
an abstract specification into a physical device) and that upwards simulation is analogous to
scientific prediction (determining an abstract prediction for a physical event). The alternative
terms for these simulations, ‘history’ and ‘prophecy’ respectively, import directly into the AR
framework and become extremely descriptive [19]. It is a fascinating implication of AR theory
that the relationship between abstract and physical objects follows the analogy with levels of
abstraction in refinement theory even outside the domain of computer science. One interesting
point to note is that, for refinement, only one of upwards and downwards simulation is needed to
prove the refinement. By contrast, AR theory requires both its analogous cycles for computing:
physical computing is the combination of experimental device theories capable of prediction
(equivalent to upwards simulation/prophecy), and of technological engineering of the device
(equivalent to downwards simulation/history). In other words, a computer is a combination of
scientific understanding and of technology use.
An interesting area for further investigation, seen also by the analogues with refinement, is
the category-theory structure of the relationship between abstract and physical objects. There
is an obvious categorical underpinning to AR theory in its commuting-diagrammatic form, and
an interesting question arises as to whether representation, while itself not mathematical, can
itself be represented in this way.
One categorical account of data refinement was given by Hoare, representing refinement as a
lax natural transformation between two models of the same category [20]. If the computational
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system is embedded in a category C, and M,N are two models of this category, then if there
is a lax natural transformation α : M → N then M is a ‘representation’ of N which is ‘more
defined’ (that is, the functors of M are defined over a larger number of objects than the functors
of N). Lax transformation is then the categorical representation of downwards/forwards sim-
ulation. More higher-level generalisations have also been studied, with the objective of finding
a better categorical description of refinement. Such notions as lax logical transformation [21]
point towards a way in which the similar concept of representation may be categorified, with
a physical object and its own abstract representation given as generalised models of a single
categorical structure.
6 Meaning and ontology
A common issue in the foundations of computing concerns the meaning of objects within the
formal systems of computation. By connecting these formal methods to the physical domain,
AR theory helps refine questions of meaning and reference within computer science.
One of the most fundamental formal models of computation is that of the lambda calculus.
In itself, it is a formal system of symbol manipulation. It has interpretations and models as any-
thing from the theory of functions, proofs, or programming languages, to definitions of effective
computability, and the internal mechanics of cartesian closed categories. Depending on which
model is being used, the semantic content to even the simple term λx.x varies enormously.
With an AR underpinning to the abstract domain, it is now possible to distinguish between
a mathematical object x being the representation of a physical system, and that same object
belonging to a model of a λ-calculus. The set of abstract objects that are representations of
physical objects, and the set of abstract objects representing models of formal systems, are not
co-extensive. Some formal systems may have a concrete model but no physical referent; and some
physical systems may have a mathematical abstraction that does not correspond to a model for
any current formal system of computation.
Physical computing ocurrs in the special case where the abstract representation of the com-
puting system, ‘bottom-up’, is also an object within a model of computation, ‘top-down’. In
this case the semantic content to a computational assertion is two-fold, and the reference of the
abstract object is similarly dual: the meaning of a term, say λyx.xy is both a computational
assertion and a description of the physical capabilities of the physical computing device (here,
that the state of two data-instantiating systems can be swapped). While formal computation
theory extends beyond objects that are representations of physical devices, it is based around,
and must be consistent with, the core of objects and relations that are.
This dual ontology of mathematical objects, both physical and abstract, while unusual in
the context of computer science, is the standard within the natural sciences. A comparison with
the situation in theoretical physics is highly instructive here. Physics started bottom-up, with
many physical systems which were then represented abstractly, and the formal mathematics of
their representations developed. Sometimes it was noted that the mathematical representations
of these physical systems also corresponded to elements of previously known mathematics.
By contrast, computer science has historically concentrated on formal systems, top-down,
with only a very narrow range of physical systems corresponding to the abstract specifications.
The challenge for non-standard and extended types of physical computing is to import some of
the methodology of natural science into computer science. Just as theoretical physics is now
starting to consider formal systems that may not correspond to physical universes (for example
generalised probabilistic theories based on quantum mechanics [22]), so computer science needs
to extend to deal with physical systems that do not immediately correspond with standard
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formal methods. Abstract representations of non-standard computing systems may be found to
correspond through some embedding or refinement or change in representation with the abstract
representation of standard computers. In some cases they may, however, require an abstract
theory of computation that is different; or another instantiation of a more general theoretical
framework. The framework of AR theory can help allow us to make that determination for novel
computing devices.
This leads to what is not a definition, but a description of the new addition AR theory gives
computer science, in the form of physical computing:
Computing is the natural science of the computational abilities of physical systems.
7 Heterotic and hybrid computing
We now apply AR theory and our understandings of refinement and ontologies to the central
issue of this paper: the representation of heterotic and hybrid computing within AR theory.
In order to highlight the central feature of heterotic computing, we first make a distinction
with non-heterotic hybrid computing. As noted in the introduction, heterotic hybrid computing
allows computations to be performed that are, in some sense to be determined, more powerful
than, or otherwise significantly different from, the computations that can be run on the individual
systems. By contrast, we will use the term ‘hybrid’, without modifier, where the computations
on the joint system are a simple composition of the computations on the individual ones.
A simple example of a hybrid system would be the human-computer interaction when, in order
to perform the calculation (10+10)/7 the human user mentally performs (10+10) and then uses
a computer to calculate 20/7. The joint computation is hybrid, but is not outside the computing
power of either individually. Contrast this with another human-computer interaction, a social
machine: for a machine such as Galaxy Zoo [13, 23], the computation performed is outside the
abilities of either the humans or the computer: the machine is heterotic.
We will postulate here a type of hybrid-heterotic distinction that is native to AR theory. It
may be the distinction, or it may be one type of a class of distinctions given by different types
of composition; this, and the relationship to heterotic systems as defined by the original authors
[1, 2], are areas for further investigation. The following can all be thought of as a consideration
of representational hybrid vs. heterotic systems.
A hybrid (unmodified) system in AR theory can be described using composition of computa-
tion in the abstract domain. Figure 8(a) shows this for two physical computing devices, p and
q (these could be a human and a computer respectively). They each encode and process infor-
mation according to their own representation relations and theory. That is, the computational
system forms two separate representational triples, 〈p,Rτ ,mp〉 and 〈q,Rν ,mq〉, where τ, ν are
the theories of the two computing systems.
There are now two possibilities for hybrid data processing. The first, as shown in figure
8(a), is parallel composition: the computation performed, C, itself a composition of Cτ , Cν , is
performed on the composed input:
Cτ,ν(mp ◦mq) : mp ◦mq −→ (mp ◦mq)
′
The second option is sequential composition. This is where the computations Cτ , Cν are per-
formed on separate machines and then composed:
Cτ (mp) ◦ Cν(mq) : mp ◦mq −→ m
′
p
◦m′
q
The case of heterotic computing differs in significant respects from straightforward hybrid
computing. In the case of heterotic systems, the composition happens in the representation
12
qp
q′
p′
nqmp nq′ mp′
mp ◦mq (mp ◦mq)
′
R˜τ RτR˜ν Rν
Cτ,ν(mp ◦mq)
q
p
q′
p′
p ◦ q p′ ◦ q′
mp◦q m′p◦q
RµR˜µ
Dµ(mp◦q)
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Commuting physical and abstract diagrams for (a) hybrid vs (b) heterotic computing.
itself, before the abstract computation is reached. Figure 8(b) shows the production of a joint
representation for the heterotic system composed of p and q. Importantly, there is only one
representational triple formed for the joint system:
〈p ◦ q,Rµ,mp◦q〉
The single representational triple then means that there is a single set of operations allowed on
the abstract input, given by the composed device theory µ. We will denote these operations Dµ.
The system then proceeds as
Dµ(mp◦q) : mp◦q −→ m
′
p◦q
The crucial difference in this heterotic case is that Dµ need not be a composition of Cτ , Cν .
Because the representation is combined, the joint system can have access to computational
operations not available to individual ones. This is the signature of heterotic computing: that
composition ocurrs in the representation, rather than within the abstract domain.
It will, in general, be delicate work to pick out exactly where the composition is occurring,
and so to argue whether a system is ‘truly’ heterotic or not. If the systems p and q are individ-
ually capable of computing, then they will participate in representational triples 〈p,Rτ ,mp〉 etc
individually, as well as jointly for the heterotic computation. Differentiating these two levels of
representation will be important.
As an example, we will consider the Galaxy Zoo social machine. A human user interacts by
classifying objects presented to them into one of several categories. The computer processes these
inputs according to its programming and produces an output. The user can be described using
〈p,Rτ ,mp〉, where τ is the computational theory of how a human computing device classifies
visual objects as ‘round’, ‘square’, etc. The computer satisfies the triple 〈q,Rν ,mq〉, where ν is
the theory of computers running Javascript. Individually, these computations make sense, and
satisfy all the relevant commuting diagrams.
However, a full description of the system is not reducible to a description in terms of these
two elements. The social machine itself is described by the triple 〈p◦q,Rµ,mp◦q〉. The theory of
this machine, µ, is the theory of a computing device that takes as input astronomical pictures and
outputs classifications of galaxies. Only in the context of theory µ are the individual actions of the
human and the computer describable as part of this computation. Furthermore, this computation
is not available to either individually (given our current understanding of the abilities of human
beings and Javascript programs).
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It is key to heterotic computing that the heterotic triple not be decomposable. For some
composition of representational triples, then, we can give a the following definition:
Definition 7. If two physical systems p and q are elements of the representational triples
〈p,Rτ ,mp〉 and 〈q,Rν ,mq〉, and individually satisfy all the requirements for being a com-
puter, and if the joint physical system p ◦ q also participates in the representational triple
〈p ◦ q,Rµ,mp◦q〉 and satisfies the requirements for being a computer, if
〈p ◦ q,Rµ,mp◦q〉 6= 〈p,Rτ ,mp〉 ◦ 〈q,Rν ,mq〉
then the computing system is heterotic. If the equality holds, then the computing system is
hybrid.
Defining composition between representational triples is an important area of further work.
This consideration of hybrid and heterotic brings us back to the centrality of representation
in computing: the different abilities of heterotic systems over their hybrid cousins lie in their
abilities to use composed representations of joint systems. We can also see another aspect of
AR theory: that more than one representation can be given for the same physical system –
even more than one computational representation, where the same physical system is taking
part in more than one computation under different representational theories. By foregrounding
representation, AR theory has given us the ability to distinguish these different computational
scenarios; and so to reason rigorously about these novel computing devices and processes.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have seen how Abstraction/Representation theory enables us to add physical
systems, both standard, unconventional, and hybrid/heterotic, into the foundational language
of computer science. By making rigorous the representation relation between physical and ab-
stract objects, we have been able to distinguish between computing in the physical domain and
computation in the abstract – and to give set of relations between the two. The algebraic and
commuting-diagram forms of AR theory can be used to show the similarities and differences
between different stages of computer design and use – from the initial experiments on a sub-
strate, to its engineering, and finally its use as a computational device. This has led us to the
AR definition of physical computing, whereby a computer is shown to be a physical device for
predicting the outcome of an abstract evolution (a computation).
Representation is key to computing: a computer is a machine that must use the represen-
tation relation as part of its functioning, as unless it is present within a compute cycle then no
computing can be said to be ocurring in a physical device.3 We have seen how the representation
relation extends the refinement and abstraction relations of Abstract Interpretation and refine-
ment theory. With the addition of AR theory, refinement diagrams can be given that commute
‘all the way down’ to the physical device (not simply the still-abstract machine code), and the
connections between the physics of the substrate and the levels of abstraction they can support
becomes clearer. We have seen furthermore the beginnings of a fascinating relationship between
types of refinement simulation, and different cycles in AR theory corresponding to science and
the use of technology.
We have defined physical computing and described the development of the natural science of
computing. We have seen how AR theory fits in with formal abstract systems of computation such
as the lambda calculus and gives a physical ontology for computation theory. This now opens up
3One may be tempted to render this conclusion as “no computation without representation”.
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the way to using AR theory in the formalisation of computing using novel physical system, such as
quantum devices and the newly-described set of internet-enabled social machines. We have seen
how these hybrid and heterotic systems can be defined and distinguished using AR theory. The
power inherent in the AR separation of abstract and physical domains, and representation, comes
out strongly as we are now able to distinguish between composition of representations (hybrid)
and composition within representation (heterotic). By no longer conflating the representation of
a device with the device itself, we are able to determine when a single device supports multiple
computational representations, and the relationships between them.
There are many, many open questions and problems here: the development of AR theory and
its application to computing is still in its first stages. It has already shown itself to be a powerful
tool for reasoning about computational systems and processes, and further work will only add to
its range of application. One immediate avenue is the extension of the analysis given above for
social machines. A full construction for a specific machine, giving the precise connection between
the different levels of representation present, and the formal definition of composition between
representational triples, is outstanding work.
Another open, and very interesting, question is how AR theory in general relates in detail
to the categorical substructures of theoretical computer science. In particular, the connection
between refinement types and the AR commutation cycles for science and technology lead to the
possibility that a categorification of AR theory would give an algebra for experimental theory
confirmation in science – and, by the Curry-Howard correspondence, an associated logic. This
would be a novel logical structure for theory choice – opening up in turn the possibility of im-
porting it back into computer science as an addition to theory discovery and decision algorithms
in artificial intelligence.
AR theory does not just add new rigorous tools for computing. The foundational gap be-
tween computational theory and physical device that has historically been present has now been
bridged. Computers show themselves as machines that manipulate both physics and represen-
tation, and computing as a process that necessarily crosses the divide between physical and
abstract. A missing piece of the puzzle in the foundations of computer science is now in place.
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